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Transparency is an important concept in International Relations. The possibility of realizing 
transparency in practice operates as a central analytical axis defining distinct positions on core 
theoretical problems within the field, from the security dilemma to the function of international 
institutions and beyond. As a political practice the pursuit of transparent governance is a dominant 
feature of global politics, promoted by a wide range of actors across a vast range of issue areas, from 
nuclear proliferation to Internet governance to the politics of foreign aid. Yet, despite its importance, 
precisely what transparency means or how the concept is understood is frequently ill-defined by 
academics and policy-makers alike. As a result, the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of 
approaches to transparency in IR often sit in tension with their wider theoretical commitments. This 
article will examine the three primary understandings of transparency used in IR in order to unpack 
these commitments. It finds that while transparency is often explicitly conceptualized as a property of 
information, particularly within rationalist scholarship, this understanding rests upon an unarticulated 
set of sociological assumptions. This analysis suggests that conceptualizing ‘transparency-as-
information’ without a wider sociology of knowledge production is highly problematic, potentially 
obscuring our ability to recognize transparent practices in global governance. Understanding 
transparency as dialogue, as a social practice rooted in shared cognitive capacities and epistemic 
frameworks, provides a firmer analytical ground from which to examine transparency in International 
Relations. 
 





Transparency is a political condition valued and pursued by countless actors in global 
politics, and transparency promotion is central to an extensive range of policy issues. 
Development aid practices, Internet governance and surveillance, the accountability of 
international institutions, democracy promotion, nuclear weapons proliferation, and the 
politics of financial regulation are all characterized by the strong positive value attached to 
transparency. Non-governmental organizations existing solely to encourage and monitor 
transparency have thrived in this climate: one estimate places the number of global 
‘transparency advocacy’ organizations at 500 (Sunlight Foundation, 2013). Nor is 
transparency subject to promotion by civil society organizations alone. Former Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton, reflecting a broader US foreign policy tradition that promotes 
transparency as a common good, stressed that ‘Historically, asymmetrical access to 
information is one of the leading causes of interstate conflict. When we face serious disputes 
or dangerous incidents, it’s critical that people on both sides of the problem have access to 
the same set of facts and opinions’ (Clinton, 2010). Transparency is portrayed as both 
2 
 
necessary and increasingly possible within a globalizing, information-centric international 
system. 
In this context, transparency seems to offer a realistic means of generating a more 
accountable, peaceful, or legitimate form of international politics. Assumptions about the 
novelty of transparency are misleading, however. The concept lies at the nexus of 
epistemological, political, and religious assumptions which have defined the Western 
political tradition and path of modernity (Foucault 1980: 153; Jay 1993). From this 
perspective, the current policy vogue for transparency is the latest manifestation of a much 
older constellation of ideals and practices linking rationality, legitimacy, and progress with 
transparency.  
It is perhaps no surprise, then, to find that even if the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) has tended not to share in the optimism of many policy makers, assumptions 
about transparency have played a key role in scholarly attempts to understand the global 
political system. The possibility of creating transparency determines positions on the offence-
defence balance (Jervis, 1976), the tractability of the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978; 
Mearsheimer, 2001; Booth and Wheeler, 2007), or the avoidance of war (Fearon, 1995; Debs 
and Monteiro, 2014), among many other central issues in the field. Linked (but not 
antithetical) to the concept of uncertainty, transparency is often portrayed as a way in which 
the problems generated by anarchy can be surmounted without the need for global 
government. Since the 18
th
 century Perpetual Peace essays of Kant and Bentham, the 
availability of information has been presented as a means of overcoming conflict and arriving 
at a more just international system (Kant, 1970a; Bentham, 1838-48). In the present day, 
transparency often appears as a source of legitimization, or even democratization, of global 
governance structures (Keohane and Buchanan, 2006; Florini, 2002).  
IR therefore represents an interesting instance of wider tendencies within social and 
political theory within which transparency has gained prominence. Yet, as with uncertainty 
(Rathbun, 2007), transparency has been weakly conceptualized in IR. This is a significant 
problem. Different concepts of transparency carry with them quite distinct epistemological, 
ontological and normative commitments. At the same time, it is not clear how far the 
dominant approaches are coherent on their own merits. Clarifying the concept of 
transparency thereby serves two primary purposes. First, it illuminates foundational 
epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning various approaches to 
transparency, a central aim for more reflective theorizing in IR. Second, carefully 
interrogating the conceptualization of transparency draws out how transparency promotion 
tends to function in practice. The claims of IR theorists and the concerns of policy-makers 
interested in transparency are often located in the same constellation of ideals and 
assumptions, as even a cursory look at international transparency promotion reveals. Policies 
formulated on the basis of partial or one-sided concepts, such as Clinton’s embrace of a quite 
rationalist take on the role of transparency in the causes of war, can often be fruitless (and 
costly) endeavours. A clearer understanding of transparency is therefore important in both 
theoretical and practical terms. The upshot is a better theoretical understanding of 
transparency as a concept, and a firmer handle on the extent to which it can live up to its 
promise as a practice.  
This paper will draw on Critical Theory to analyse the conceptualization of 
transparency in IR. It does so as follows. First, we will note three generic concepts of 
transparency employed in International Relations: ‘transparency-as-disclosure’, 
‘transparency-as-dialogue’, and ‘transparency-as-information’. Second, we will examine 
treatment of transparency in the rationalist literature on war and conflict.
1
 Rationalists 
suggest that states can inform others of their intentions – can become more transparent – by 
signalling willingness to pay a high cost to secure their preferred bargaining outcomes. Third, 
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we will unpack the underlying epistemological and ontological commitments of rationalist 
‘transparency-as-information’ approaches. Focusing upon claims about the ontological 
character of information within RCT approaches, this discussion will expand upon earlier 
discussions between rationalist and constructivist approaches, in which the motivations of 
actors engaged in communication formed the central axis of debate (Lynch, 2002; Risse, 
2000).
2
 Rationalist approaches suggest subjectively formed preferences can be objectively 
signalled and interpreted. Knowledge, in this view, is a property of information itself; as a 
result, very costly signals objectively indicate a willingness to fight. However, we argue that 
this commitment cannot be made absent a far richer sociology underpinning RCT theories in 
which actors share norms and interpretive values.  
Thus, in the concluding section of the paper, we explore whether it is possible to 
understand the relationship between strategic action and shared epistemological frameworks 
via Habermas’ Critical Theory. This discussion finds that ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ 
identifies the preconditions of transparency with greatest clarity and depth. Rethinking 
transparency in these terms – as socio-historical, as an accomplishment, not an entity – 
highlights both the ethical appeal of transparency, but also the fragility and contingency of 
these practices. At the same time, the universalist ambitions of the Habermasian project 
suggests a deeper, more troubling challenge to politics itself that transparency, in any guise, 
may necessarily entail.  
 
Clarifying the concept of transparency in International Relations 
 
 Conceptual development is a central aspect of all work in social science. The 
employment of clear, useful, resonant, and precise concepts is vital to productive theoretical 
and empirical analysis (Gerring, 1999). Despite the increasing recognition of the central role 
of concept formation in the social sciences (Sayer, 2000; Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2006), 
treatments of transparency in IR have undertaken relatively little of this work. Undoubtedly, 
definitions are provided that are more or less succinct and more or less useful for empirical 
study (Florini, 2002; Finel and Lord, 1999; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Lindley, 2003). 
However, these often fail to outline their constituent elements in detail. The conditions 
necessary or sufficient for a claim of transparency’s existence are underspecified. The 
historical purview of transparency as a practice, and the historical context of its theorization, 
is often not well laid out. The internal relations of the concept of transparency – the elements 
that constitute the concept, as ‘participation’ is internal to ‘democracy’ or ‘wage labour’ to 
‘capitalism’ – are rarely discussed in detail. Questions around the reflexivity of the concept 
and its employment are not thoroughly engaged, with the relationship between scholar and 
object of study underspecified. While the concept of transparency may seem straightforward, 
its different articulations – discussed below – suggest that research on transparency needs to 
clarify these assumptions.  
Any given concept of transparency implies a particular understanding of the furniture 
of the world and how it may come to be known. The visual metaphors most often used to 
describe transparency – ‘its fundamental idea is that of a clean window that you can look 
through’ (Bianchi, 2013: 9) – suggest that the world has a structure independent of us and 
that it is knowable in some direct sense. It is important to clarify the extent to which this 
common sense understanding is actually what specific usages of the concept maintain. 
Laying out the underpinnings of the concept of transparency allows us to remain conscious of 
the simplifications that concepts necessarily entail, an important step in avoiding reification 
(Levine, 2012).  To this end, it is necessary to undertake some ground-clearing work to 
identify the disparate and sometimes implicit or ill-defined ways transparency is used in IR. 
Outlining these generic understandings is a useful first step towards developing sound 
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research projects on transparency in global politics; absent this step analyses will continue to 
risk ad hoc theorization.  
The roots of the term transparent are found in 15
th
 century late middle English, from 
the medieval Latin transparent meaning ‘shining through’ or ‘that can be seen through’ and 
from the Latin transparere, combining trans ‘through’ + parere ‘appear’ (Hoad, 2003; OED, 
2014).
3
 Subsequent development of the term continues to have this link to appearance and to 
the notion of seeing through. Scientific usage refers to objects or material that can be seen 
through or that allow light to pass through uninterrupted. Linguistics adds ‘that can be 
extrapolated from surface structure’ (OED, 2014). More broadly, the term is used to denote 
‘obvious in structure or meaning’ (Aarts, 2014) or ‘easily seen through, recognized, 
understood or detected’ (OED, 2014). Related terms used to define transparent echo these 
features, such as ‘frank’, ‘candid’ or ‘ingenuous’ (OED, 2014). Transparency is the quality of 
being transparent. In quite generic terms the concept of transparency refers to understanding 
some object or some communication that has an obvious and clear quality.  
Recognizing ‘understanding’ as central to the concept of transparency suggests that 
some usages in the IR literature do not accord with generic common sense usage of the term, 
failing to meet criteria of familiarity or resonance (Gerring, 1999). Finel and Lord (1999: 
317), for example, explicitly empty their concept of transparency of any reference to 
understanding: 
 
In our definition, transparency is viewed independently of how information is 
interpreted. This approach allows us to isolate the effects of transparency without 
biasing the results. However, this objectivity comes at a price. Without solid 
conceptual reasons to prioritize different aspects of transparency we can only identify 
cases of “more” or “less” transparency. 
 
Their concept of transparency is ‘objective’ in that they focus their attention on observable 
features, rather than unobservables such as preferences or beliefs. The resultant ‘transparency 
index’ approaches the public disclosure of information by measuring the amount (but not 
quality or kind, as denoted by ‘easy to perceive’) of political debate, information control, and 
disclosure, such as the number of political parties or the frequency of data releases. Finel and 
Lord limit their concept of transparency to what should be called, without harm, simply 
‘information flows’; the category of ‘understanding’ is sufficiently important in general usage 
that using the term to refer to something being transparent but not understood seems 
misplaced.  As we shall see, the equation of knowledge with increased quantities of 
information is a common feature of accounts of transparency, but nearly all such accounts 
stress that the increased quantity of information is understood correctly by its audience. 
 Despite the relatively clear meaning of the term, there is significant scope for varied 
concepts of transparency once its basic elements are elaborated and placed within a wider 
theoretical setting. Of particular interest is the ambiguity surrounding the notion of 
‘understanding’ and how this quality of transparency is itself to be understood. If grasped as a 
quality pertaining to an object or communication this may lend itself to relatively 
straightforward empiricist uses of the concept. That is, an object is easily understood on its 
surface without need for detailed interpretation. For example, an increase in information 
flows may be argued to increase transparency, as any increase in information will be easily 
grasped – ‘extrapolation from surface structure’ is indicative here. While this is not supported 
by detailed studies (eg. Fung, Graham and Weil, 2005), some transparency activists seem to 
have this understanding, such as the Wikileaks movement or naïve forms of libertarianism. 
The qualities of ‘clarity’ and ‘ease of understanding’ may, in contrast, suggest a gap in social 
reality between appearance and essence – the creation of transparency as moving beyond 
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appearances to grasp the essence of an object, event or process.  The generic sense of 
transparency is sufficiently broad that only quite sceptical positions towards knowledge 
production foreclose use of this concept.  
 Each distinct approach to transparency in IR carries with it different orientations to 
other key concepts in the discipline, such as the nature of the state, the character of anarchy, 
the dimensions of social power, and the key actors and agents driving international politics. 
Many IR scholars follow the common-sense liberal usage of transparency that prevails in 
wider political discourse, taking ‘transparency’ to refer to a one-way interaction between 
states and institutions on one side and domestic or international publics on the other 
(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Broz, 2002). The state or institution possesses information 
about its aims, goals, intentions, resources, and so forth and has the capacity either to disclose 
this information to the public or to keep it secret. This capacity, sometimes called 
authoritative power (Giddens, 1981), is a potential source of domination over the public. If 
the public is not informed about the intentions or resources possessed by the state it will not 
be able to come to reasoned judgements, the basis of which may be necessary to challenge 
public policy decisions. Government or other organizations act transparently when they 
increase the amount of information available to the public about their activities, intentions, 
and decision-making processes. Disclosure allows the public to monitor the conduct of 
government, holding government accountable for its conduct and acting as a check against 
corruption or mismanagement (Broz, 2002: 865).  The public gains access to information, 
which it understands, generating clarity around decision-making processes. A shared 
framework of interpretation is assumed in these approaches. No reciprocal exchange of 
information from public to government is necessary to designate the relationship a 
transparent one.  In this sense, we see an alteration in the asymmetrical management of 
information. In relative terms, transparency increases the power of the public over 
government, as the public maintains its rights to privacy and secrecy in a manner in which the 
state does not.  We label this concept ‘transparency-as-disclosure’. 
While greater transparency is often claimed to dissipate a state’s power over the 
public, this occurs only if the government has a feedback mechanism between the public’s 
newly informed preferences and state policy. The assumption in ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ 
is that transparency carries a positive normative value, closely linked to the perceived 
legitimacy and accountability of governing institutions (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; cf. 
Stasavage, 2004). Politics is thereby understood in a quite specific way within ‘transparency-
as-disclosure’. In agonistic approaches to the political, classically embodied in IR in 
Morgenthau’s work, politics is an arena of continual contestation over normative conceptions 
of social life (Morgenthau, 1946). Attempts to transcend the agonism of the political risk the 
closure of fruitful contradictions which embody the potential for progressive social change 
(Williams 2005: 115-117). Paradoxically, perhaps, disclosure approaches treat the political as 
a dysfunctional and wholly negative sphere of society. Concealment and corruption are not, 
within these arguments, motivated by the pursuit of any political ideals, but are the product of 
self-interested and thoroughly cynical individual practices. Lying in pursuit of a larger ethical 
aim (such as the national interest) is illegitimate because it prevents the realization of the 
positive effects of transparency promotion. In this way, transparency-as-disclosure does not 
require democratic participation. The beneficial ends of transparency promotion are clear, 
and their realization is a matter of implementation, not contestation. The creation of monitory 
democracy, rather than participatory democracy, functions as the central aim. The political is 
thus something to be overcome, rather than contained.
4
 Understood in this sense, 
‘transparency-as-disclosure’ presents a strong challenge to ideas about politics prevalent 
throughout the history of International Relations.  
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Increasingly, this understanding of transparency, developed initially to analyse 
relations between a state and its civil society, has been extended to cover the relationship 
between institutions of global governance and their constituents (Wang and Rosenau, 2001; 
Hale, 2008; Donaldson and Kingsbury, 2013). However, ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ has 
deep roots in international political thought. This conception of transparency was central to 
Bentham’s claim that public scrutiny could overcome the bellicosity of European foreign 
ministries, a claim that resonates throughout contemporary global politics.
5
 Warlike 
behaviour was not to be addressed with moral exhortations to act differently but via the 
public provision of information (Bentham, 1838-1843). Similar assumptions are apparent in 
Kant’s reflections on international relations, Leon Trotsky and Woodrow Wilson’s conjoined 
promises to end secret diplomacy after the First World War, and recent actions by 21
st
 
century transparency activists and NGOs.
6
 As a concept, then, ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ 
carries significant content or intension (Gerring, 1999), defining a relationship between a 
state or governing institution and civil society or public, in which the open one-way 
transmission of information, within an implicitly shared epistemic framework between 
government and public, is normatively desirable as it alters oppressive power relations that 
constrict liberty, democracy and peace.  
A second conception of transparency in IR defines it as the openness required for a 
dialogue. This concept is most readily identified with strands of critical international relations 
theory drawing upon Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Linklater, 1998; Fluck, 
2014; cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987), but stands in a wider tradition which emphasises the moral 
and political importance of mutual recognition by rationally autonomous actors. We denote 
this concept ‘transparency-as-dialogue’. While less intuitively appealing than transparency-
as-disclosure, this understanding is often implicit in claims that transparency is a source of 
emancipation, empowerment or legitimacy (Fluck, 2015). Rooted in Kantian ethics, 
transparency is understood in terms of an ethical orientation towards others in which actors 
share a commitment to open, rational dialogue (Kant, 1983). Kantian openness is 
characterized by a willingness to engage in clear and truthful dialogue with other actors, who 
reciprocate due to the common disposition to allow the force of better argument to prevail in 
any political contest.  
By emphasizing mutual recognition and the central role of interpretation, 
‘transparency-as-dialogue’ points to a different understanding of power, the state and the 
public sphere than found in ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ and, more fundamentally, it points 
towards a different understanding of rationality. ‘Transparency-as-dialogue’ involves less the 
transfer of information than mutual openness about reasons and motivations in a continual 
process of rational communication. Rationality for Habermas is not adherence to cost-benefit 
analysis but rather the intersubjective process of critical reflection. The discursive 
interpretation of information is emphasized over the quantity of information circulating 
within a given political system. The classic statement of this position, in which epistemic 
access is linked via procedures of cognition and justification to more just and rational forms 
of governance, is Kant’s transcendental formula of public right, according to which ‘All 
actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is incompatible 
with their being made public’ (Kant, 1970a: 126). Transparency matters for Kant not simply 
because it tips the balance of power – as it does for Bentham - from government towards the 
public but because it is a precondition for rational, and therefore legitimate, government. 
Publicity is a means of approximating in practice the rational consistency and autonomy Kant 
argues is required for moral behaviour. This Kantian understanding of transparency has been 
taken up by Habermas. Drawing a contrast between his theory and Mill’s liberalism, 
Habermas has made clear that he rejects the ideal of a totally transparent society (Habermas, 
1992: 171). Nevertheless, he equates validity with that which would survive idealised public 
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discursive testing (McCarthy, 1978: 35). It is vital to this process – which lies at the heart of 
Habermas’s discourse ethics – that ‘participants can be truthful in their relations to 
themselves and can make their ‘inner natures’ transparent to others’ (McCarthy, 1978: 307). 
For Habermas, this is not simply a formal prerequisite for discourse – an approximation of 
this transparency plays a vital role in the historical development of the modern public sphere. 
The emergence of a critical public occurred in part as individuals began to make their 
experiences transparent to a wider public in the 18
th
 century, initially through the medium of 
letters (Habermas, 1989; Stasavage, 2004: 683-688). In conjunction with the interpretation of 
data and the assessment of validity claims, ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ entails openness about 
reasons and motivations that is also central to the process of identity formation and 
transformation. Such behaviour is not transhistorical but emerged as a result of processes of 
economic and social change (Habermas, 1989; Habermas, 1985).  
While sharing some similarities with ‘transparency-as-disclosure’, ‘transparency-as-
dialogue’ therefore denotes a different content to the concept, with actors – not necessarily 
states or governments – committed to two-way dialogue, dependent upon their moral 
recognition, within a specific social and historical context. Most centrally, ‘transparency-as-
dialogue’ defines itself through a consideration of actors’ ethical orientation to argumentation 
and its stress upon the necessary interpretation of information received. As a result, it 
arguably better captures the aspiration for meaningful political participation and responsive 
institutions reflected in many calls for transparency. 
  A third conception of transparency has emerged in IR over the past 25 years. Within 
the rationalist literature on bargaining, conflict and war, the transmission of signals between 
states is outlined as key to a transparent understanding of actors’ intentions (Rasler and 
Thompson, 2005: 6-7). In contrast to the above approaches, transparency is conceptualized as 
the disclosure of information between states – understood as unified actors - rather than to a 
public. Rather than empowering publics, and thus altering hierarchical relations between 
political institutions and the public, rationalists examine how formally equal actors can 
generate transparent signals of their intentions over a conflict issue.  Despite these 
differences, unpacking the assumptions of rationalist approaches reveals some problematic 
underpinnings of ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ and hidden connections to ‘transparency-as-
dialogue’. We will now examine how transparency is understood in rationalist work in order 
to explore these connections. 
 
 
Clear signals and shared understandings: rational choice approaches to transparency 
 
 While the rational choice approach to transparency shares some features with the 
broader ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ literature, its starting point does not derive from a focus 
upon corruption and democratic public deliberation. Rather, RCT approaches to war are 
focused upon what may be the defining issue of IR theory: the problem of uncertainty 
(Rathbun, 2007). Solutions to the problem of uncertainty in large part define the analytical 
positions that populate the discipline. The large literature on the security dilemma has 
focused most closely upon the dynamics of uncertainty and thus provides a prime example of 
this broader work (Jervis, 1976; Booth and Wheeler, 2007; Mearsheimer, 2001; Schultz, 
2012: 372). Within an anarchical international system states can never be sure of the 
intentions of others; they have no access to others’ true intentions and the real purpose of 
others actions. This creates two ‘lemmas’: uncertainty of how to interpret signals sent from 
other states – is a military build-up aggressive or defensive? (Jervis, 1978) – and subsequent 
uncertainty of how one should respond in turn (Booth and Wheeler, 2007). The security 
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dilemma thus centres upon information flows and the absence of understanding – states have 
no information that can inform them with certainty of the intentions of others.  
As a result, purely defensive or security-seeking policies can appear to others as 
preparation for war; they are simply too ambiguous to be understood as signalling any 
specific policy. The misperceptions and misinterpretations are sufficiently large that states 
can fall into conflict without intending or desiring to do so. The July crisis that led to the 
outbreak of the First World War serves as the classic example (Fearon, 1995: 397; Glaser, 
2010). Uncertainty does not refer to an inability to understand the information one receives; 
the literal content of a signal is grasped, as it must be if uncertainty over intentions is to have 
any meaning. The literature on the security dilemma relies upon structural explanations for 
uncertainty and misperception, rather than the limits of human rationality as such. This is 
particularly important for rational choice models in IR, as we shall see in a moment.  
With these basic starting points in mind we can set out the rationalist literature on 
war, bargaining and signalling. RCT approaches accept the basic starting points of structural 
realist theories – the international system is anarchic, states as a result must rely on self-help, 
and states are often uncertain about the intentions of other actors in the system. The signal 
contribution rationalist approaches develop is the reconfiguration of these general arguments 
into a rational choice understanding of political action.
7
 This allows for a clear and rigorous 
restatement of many of the positions of other theories in order to examine their underlying 
logic.
8
 RCT scholars assert that states are rational actors with a set of ordered and intransitive 
subjective preferences for outcomes in any given strategic environment. Preferences remain 
stable within these models and political calculations are designed to meet subjective 
preferences. Strategic calculations are designed to maximize utility and minimize cost or, to 
put it differently, to realize one’s preferences with the greatest efficiency. In a formulation 
draw on by RCT IR scholars, Elster provides the clearest succinct statement of this principle 
‘To act rationally, then, simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in a feasible set.’ 
(Elster, 1986, quoted in Kahler, 1998: 923). Reflection upon a set of preferences is not part of 
this definition.  
On any given issue actors will have a set of preferences that they will attempt to 
realize at the most efficient possible cost. Crucially, this information is privately held – other 
actors in the system do not know actors preferences or what policies other states will choose 
to secure these preferences (Fearon, 1995: 381, 391; Morrow, 1989; Glaser, 1997: 174). In 
the absence of this complete information states have an incentive to lie – states that bluff 
about their capacities or intentions may meet their policy aims at less cost than the ‘honest’ 
alternative. However, in a crisis situation it also risks a war that will make everyone worse off 
than a negotiated settlement, regardless of how the conflict ends (Morrow, 1989: 946). The 
tragedy of this outcome is conceptualized in cost-benefit terms – war is costly, and actors 
could have achieved an acceptable bargain over a conflict issue without having to resort to 
fighting. Fearon states ‘As long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is 
always inefficient ex post – both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved 
the same final resolution without suffering the costs (or by paying lower costs)’(Fearon, 
1995: 383). Even when both sides are security seekers oriented to cooperation structural 
uncertainty can create the least desired outcome.
9
  
Rational choice approaches explain how rational actors can come to an unwanted 
conflict without resorting to claims of misperception or psychological explanations (Glaser, 
1997), in contrast to theories of misperception, in which complete information environments 
cannot overcome cognitive biases (Jervis, 1976).
10
 In the rationalist view it is not the 
capacities of actors that define problems of bargaining – again, this is not the general 
scepticism of classical Realism – but the lack of credible information in the strategic 
environment.  To this extent, RCT approaches lie within the wider modern discourse of 
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transparency-as-disclosure, in that the release of information, not dialogue or mutual 
recognition, constitutes the focus of political concern.  
The rationalist literature has been centrally concerned with modelling the various 
costs of signalling in order to understand how and why a given signal may be granted greater 
credibility than its alternatives.
11
 Given the assumption of shared standards of rationality, 
several potential signalling mechanisms have been theorized: engaging domestic audience 
costs or ‘tying hands’ (Fearon, 1994; Kurizaki, 2007; Tarar and Leventoglu, 2013); investing 
in ‘sunk costs’ to signal resolve, such as high military spending (Fearon, 1994; 1997); 
engaging reputational costs internationally (Sartori, 2002); or generating market-costs 
(Gartzke, 2007).
12
 We will only outline the first of these, in the interest of brevity, and as the 
essential dynamics of signalling are the same in any case. This discussion will not assess the 
empirical validity of the audience costs model, as we are interested in the conceptual and 
theoretical foundations of RCT models.
13
 
In any crisis, two actors will possess a range of privately held preferences. In a 
conflict over a given piece of territory, for example, there are a range of bargains that are 
acceptable to both sides, if one assumes, as rationalists do, that the object of contention is 
divisible or negotiable in some sense. Each side is, of course, incentivized to achieve the best 
outcome possible, thus the incentive to misrepresent the deal they would accept and the 
capabilities they possess. The rationalist literature has, however, added an important 
qualification. While states may want to misrepresent their bargaining set, they must balance 
this against the costs that actually going to war would impose alongside the probability of 
winning a conflict (Fearon, 1995). If war costs more than the range of acceptable bargaining 
outcomes, once the uncertain probability of victory is factored in, the resort to war would be 
inefficient. In order to avoid such outcomes, states whose value for war falls within these 
parameters have an incentive to signal their preferences to arrive at a less costly outcome.  
The way to indicate one’s intentions is to generate costly signals. If an actor is highly 
resolved over a given issue they will be willing to invest to achieve preferred outcomes. In 
the audience costs literature this involves publicly signalling a willingness to fight, engaging 
domestic audiences by increasing the consequences of backing down.
14
 In this way, 
rationalists explain the drive for transparency as the result of self-interest and utility 
maximization, not an altered conception of interests or identity, in contrast to ‘transparency-
as-dialogue’. Actors communicate two separate signals: first, a claim over the distribution of 
a given object, conveying preferences; and second, the credibility of this first claim, or an 
actors’ resolve in relation to their preferences. The path to infinite regress seems open here – 
what signals signal the resolve to be resolved? – suggesting the need for a shared interpretive 
ground between social actors.  
Signalling and the transmission of credible, understandable, information, relies upon a 
number of interesting claims. In contrast to some ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ arguments, 
rational choice theorists do not suggest that the mere provision of more information will have 
any effect in leading to negotiated settlements. Rather, they investigate how it may be 
possible to signal the right kind of information.
15
 Overcoming uncertainty does not involve 
altering the structural conditions that initially generated the problem of incomplete 
information and the incentive to lie. Instead, actors must realize that they can achieve more 
efficient outcomes if they generate credible signals. In contrast to liberal institutionalism and 
‘transparency-as-disclosure’ approaches focused at the domestic level, which emphasize the 
creation of transparency through alteration of institutions (but not structures), for RCT 
approaches in IR transparency is produced by actors, rather than any substantive change to 





The limits of transparency-as-information 
 
There are a number of problematic features of these arguments, each of which point to 
wider problems with the way transparency is often understood in IR and beyond. First, the 
specific claims of rationalist theories of conflict in IR rely upon unstated assumptions of 
shared normative understandings between actors. Marc Trachtenberg, in his survey and 
critique of audience costs theory, notes  
 
Whatever the intentions of the leaders of the democratic state, the audience costs 
mechanism can be decisive only if the opposing power understands why it would be 
hard for those leaders to back down. Unless the adversary is able to see why the 
democratic power’s leaders’ hands are tied, it would have no reason to conclude that 
they are not bluffing. So for the audience costs argument to hold, the adversary power 
has to understand that the democratic leaders would find it hard to give way for fear 
of incurring audience costs (Trachtenberg, 2012: 7). 
 
Trachtenberg highlights an important potential shortcoming of rationalist approaches 
to signalling and transparency. For Trachtenberg, as for ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ and 
implicitly within ‘transparency-as-disclosure’, shared norms underpin the interpretation of 
signals. The strategic context within which signals are sent is thereby thicker than rationalist 
approaches allow.  The RCT reply – that any rational actor in that strategic context would 
make the same decision – reduces the issue down to rationality as a property of individuals, 
and suggests a slightly circular reasoning pattern: a costly signal is rational because rational 
actors believe it. There is the related problem of signalling ‘type’ – security seekers will send 
different signals than greedy states (Glaser, 2010). How actors know ‘type’ is left unclear – it 
forms one of the assumptions of the theory, not one of its explanadum. Deciding between 
these different approaches rests upon how expansive a conception of individual rationality we 
are willing to countenance without questioning the rationalist project.  
 Another difficulty – one shared by some versions of ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ – 
arises from the fact that rationalism suggests that information carries the property of 
knowledge. Rationalists ontologize knowledge as an object that can be possessed, shared or 
hoarded to achieve strategic aims. This is a problematic way of conceptualizing knowledge 
(Sayer, 2000: 13-14). Making information available to others leads to the dissemination of 
knowledge, a property of the information rather than the product of complex and contested 
political processes. Claims that rationalism operates with a grasp of the role of ‘common 
knowledge’ shared with interpretivist approaches are slightly misleading (although, as we 
will see in a moment, not entirely mistaken) (e.g. Wendt, 1999: 159-162). It is not the case 
that rationalist understandings of common knowledge are similar to shared social norms and 
values. Within RCT perspectives, common knowledge simply refers to information that is 
known by all participants in an interaction based on the true state of the world; in 
Geanakoplos’ example, common knowledge refers to participants’ knowledge of the colour 
of hats, not whether they know what makes something a hat, the type of knowledge 
constructivists are primarily interested in (Geanakoplos, 1992: passim). As Rathbun notes,  
 
Some might maintain that rationalists emphasize subjectivity, but this is not the case 
in an interpretive sense. When rationalists refer to differing perceptions, they are 
referring to differently held ideas about the strategic situation on opposite side of any 




Rathbun correctly notes that it is the lack of information, not problems interpreting 
information, which generates the specific problematics of rationalism: ‘It is a volume 
question, not an interpretive one. There is a quantitative deficiency, not an analytical one’ 
(ibid). It is not an analytical issue because the information does not need to be interpreted. 
Knowledge is a property of information, so that once information is shared between states 
knowledge is also shared. The idea of knowledge as a property of information is deeply 
embedded within concepts of ‘transparency-as-disclosure’, as well as ‘transparency-as-
information.’ It has an immediately appealing quality – of course we must have access to 
information in order to have knowledge of how governments operate, what other states want, 
how to cooperate effectively, and so forth. Reducing knowledge to information is, however, 
misleading. Put simply, while all knowledge contains information, not all information can be 
considered knowledge.   
There is also a certain disjuncture between the ability of actors to rationally 
understand a specific set of signals and their general inability to objectively know anything of 
their strategic choice setting. Actors have desires and beliefs about the value of specific 
outcomes, but rationalism does not claim that actors have knowledge - in any firm sense – of 
the actual value of goods, or even of their own abilities. For rational choice theory, beliefs do 
not have to be true, in the singular sense of precise knowledge about a state of the world, to 
be rational. Rather, they must only be ‘well grounded in the available information’ (Elster, 
1994: 23). Yet ‘well grounded’, or similar formulations, leave unclear the precise nature of 
knowledge in rationalist scholarship. In general, RCT approaches suggest that a 
correspondence theory of truth is the basis of a belief being ‘true’ or not. Elster (1994) and 
Farrell and Rabin (1996) suggest that true beliefs correspond to ‘the facts’. 16 Yet, for 
rationalists in IR, the belief by state A that its opponent is firmly resolved does not depend on 
any relationship to ‘the facts’ – to actors being firmly resolved as a fact of the world - either 
at a specific moment in time or in the longer term. The claim that costly signals indicate 
resolve is not an empirical proposition, partially because the theory is not explanatory – 
again, it is a theory about how states should act, not how states do act – and partially due to 
the subsumption of signal interpretation into the category of rationality itself. Any 
correspondence theory of truth is seemingly foreclosed by these moves. The validity of 
beliefs about signalling is not checked via recourse to a state of the world, but against an 
understanding of the cost-benefits that certain types of actors will pay in given choice 
situations.  
 Similarly, the idea that actors act based upon the correspondence of their beliefs to 
the nature of the world does not seem plausible if the criteria by which these judgements are 
made are a priori, rather than as a result of experiential learning, shared understandings of 
what constitutes rationality, or practical interventions into the world itself, whereby the 
correspondence of belief to the facts can be tested. If one takes Elster’s claim that certain 
beliefs are rational because ‘in the long-run [they] tend to produce more true beliefs than any 
alternative procedure’ (1994: 23) then rationality would seem to be historically determined, 
rather than the product of the nature of individual rationality as such. The implication for 
rationalist theory is that signalling, and transparency in international relations, is a historically 
specific practice involving trial-and-error. This is not necessarily a substantial problem for 
the rationalist conflict bargaining research programme – it is entirely reasonable to try and 
figure out, empirically, which signals convey intentions most effectively. It does suggest, 
however, that the concept of transparency in IR should account for the historical and social 
practices that generate the underlying conditions whereby signals can be understood, rather 
than attributing understanding to an ever broadening set of rational capacities or the 
problematic notion of knowledge as an objective property of information.  
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RCT accounts of strategic action must reach beyond these parameters. In fact, as 
rational choice theorists have explained (Schelling 1960), there is an important difference 
between strategic and instrumental or ‘parametric’ action (Johnson, 1991: 189). While 
instrumental actors simply treat rivals as they would objects in the natural world, strategic 
actors – as found in rationalist IR scholarship -  approach others as rational, intentional beings 
who ‘can grasp that the pursuit of their individual plans is entangled in a web of social 
interdependencies’ (Ibid., 190). The RCT account of strategic action must presuppose that 
actors recognise the cognitive and rational capabilities of others, and that mutual recognition 
determines the social context in which they interact. Moreover, while rationalism is formal to 
the extent that it rejects direct investigation of socially specific norms and characteristics, 
comparison with simple instrumental action suggests that it does presuppose a particular set 
of cognitive perspectives and capabilities. For strategic action to make sense, a relatively 
‘thick’ account of the common capabilities, characteristics, and attitudes of those actors is 
seemingly required. Rolling these necessary assumptions into rationality as such does not 
overcome this need.  
The tension this gives rise to is manifested in the epistemological assumptions which 
underlie rationalist accounts of transparency in the international system. While at one level 
transparency is presented as a matter of access to or transmission of greater quantities of 
information, at another level, as explained above, for transparency to make any sense actors 
must rely on a raft of mutually recognised understandings, capabilities, and expectations 
Knowledge is more than information, as the focus on the quality of information within 
rationalism indicates (Debs and Monteiro, 2014). These unavoidable assumptions threaten to 
pull apart the rationalist model and are therefore excluded from any explicit role in the 
conceptions of transparency which the signalling literature employs. The social ‘thickness’ of 
RCT suggests that, contrary to its assumptions, transparency develops out of social 
foundations of a particular quality. This points beyond ‘transparency-as-information’ towards 
the ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ model described earlier in the paper.  
 
Cognitive and epistemic features of transparency and social interdependence 
 
While the rationalist approach does not present, in our view, the most appropriate way to 
define the concept of transparency, this also does not mean that a focus upon transparency via 
the lens of strategic action is not valuable. Instead, it points towards a concept of 
transparency in which both ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ and ‘transparency-as-information’ are 
only conceivable within specific socio-historical contexts. Exploring these ideas through the 
dialogue between rational choice theory and Frankfurt School Critical Theory – a dialogue 
often ignored in IR – provides a means to illustrate this important point.17  
  Scholarship inspired by Critical Theory, particularly the version of it associated with 
Jurgen Habermas, has engaged the rational choice project in a series of articles since the 
1980s (Johnson, 1991, 1993; Dryzek, 1993; Schiemann, 2000).  Criticism of RCT from this 
perspective arises, in part, from the way in which its formalistic methodology and 
individualist ontology obscure the social dimensions of knowledge. Critical Theorists assert 
that, in contrast with ‘sociological’ approaches concerned with historically located social 
structures and shared norms, RCT depends on an atomistic model of the social world which, 
coupled with a formal or ‘economic’ approach, excludes a consideration of specific social 
forms (Johnson, 1991: 191). As we have noted above, this atomism and formalism determine 
the concept of transparency adopted by rationalist scholarship in IR. It cannot grasp the 
development of shared values, norms, practices, or capabilities, and thus cannot tell us how 
these strategic contexts arise, or how the shared epistemic standards necessary for 
transparency came into being. For Critical Theorists, this problem can be addressed by 
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grounding such thought in real conditions, on the one hand, and really effective but not fully 
realised ideals, on the other.    
If we follow James Johnson in comparing RCT with one of the main manifestations of 
‘transparency-as-dialogue’ and the most influential strand of Critical Theory, Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action, the implications for the concept of transparency in IR 
become apparent. Our aim is not to endorse Habermas’s wider Critical Theory, but to use his 
theory to draw out assumptions implicit in ‘transparency-as-information’. 
RCT and Habermasian Critical Theory have more in common than it might seem 
(Johnson 1991, 1993). Both have been concerned to formulate ‘rational reconstructions’ of 
the social world and to explore what rationality in social action would involve. Habermas 
identifies strategic action oriented to success as one of two main forms of social action, the 
other being communicative action oriented to mutual understanding. While Habermas, in 
keeping with the historical materialist tradition, outlines a set of basic rational human 
capacities akin to rationalism, these capacities are not necessarily realized in actual historical 
practice (Geras, 1985). His is not an empirical theory but an attempt to identify the core 
elements of a never entirely actualised social reason by means of an account of the ‘universal 
pragmatics’ of speech. On the one hand, it points to particular cognitive structures and 
relationships which must have developed for transparency to make sense. On the other hand, 
those structures consist in part of idealisations and assumptions which are not necessarily 
realised in practice. 
Habermas has drawn on the work of psychologists Lawrence Kohlberg and Robert 
Selman to outline an account of ‘perspective-taking’ which links different forms and levels of 
rationality to the emergence of particular sets of socio-cognitive capabilities. This approach 
highlights the specific, mutually recognised socio-cognitive characteristics and relationships 
that must be in place for claims about transparency to make sense between individuals, and 
by implication different political communities. Thus, Habermas’s account of rationality 
makes explicit the sorts of capabilities and relationships which rationalism presupposes. 
Specifically, in this approach transparency depends on the emergence of cognitive capacities 
for relatively sophisticated mutual recognition. Drawing on developmental psychology, 
Habermas elaborates the speech positions and action orientations in involved in different 
forms of rational action. From this perspective, as actors’ socio-cognitive capabilities become 
more sophisticated their understanding of world becomes ‘decentred’ (Habermas, 1990: 132) 
- they learn to distinguish between the world as it appears to them, the world as it appears to 
others and the world as it really is.  
Habermas provides an account of the development of strategic action in terms of the 
‘integration of the observer perspective into the sphere of interaction’ which is helpful when 
considering the tensions we have identified in the RCT approach to transparency (Ibid. 140; 
Johnson, 1991). Following Selman, between the ages of 7 and 12 (Selman’s Level 2 of 
development) children develop the ability to ‘differentiate between the outer and the inner 
world of a person, to impute intentions and need dispositions, and to distinguish intentional 
from unintentional acts.’ (Habermas, 1990: 147). As a result, they are able to engage in the 
deception required for competitive action. However, at this stage psychological experiments 
involving two player games demonstrate that they are incapable of strategic action since they 
have no understanding of the (social) structure of a given interaction and the forms of 
reciprocity involved. That is to say, they have not developed a perspective from which 
interaction itself can be objectified. The transition from simple instrumental to strategic 
action comes at ages 10 to 15 (Selman’s Level 3), at which point an actor no longer only 
takes an ‘I–thou’ perspective but also takes an ‘observer perspective’ in relation to 
interaction. With this, according to Habermas, we find the ‘coordination of observer and 
participant perspectives’. This shift in perspective is accompanied by a different 
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understanding of other actors, who are now recognised as subjects ‘who intuitively follow the 
rules of rational choice.’ Strategic action – an ‘extrapolation of conflict behaviour guided by 
self-interest’ – is now possible (Ibid. 140). 
 Thus, there is nothing straightforward about transparency in social relationships. For 
example, actors can only engage in the transparent interaction associated with friendship if 
they have developed the required perspective (Selman’s Level 2). Outside of this context (in 
Selman’s account before the age of 7) the ideal of transparency does not make much sense – 
since actors do not recognise any exterior/interior difference they must assume that behaviour 
signals real intent and preference.  
At Level 3 the actor perceives that ‘thoughts and experiences are mutually shared’ 
(Ibid. 144). This adds another element to the epistemic stance involved in social action and 
generates a context in which strategic behaviour is possible. As Johnson explains: ‘Strategic 
actors must be capable of grasping the web of social interdependencies in which their plans 
are embedded’ (Johnson, 1991: 195). Habermas’ own association of strategic action with 
deception alone is misleading since underlying it is a complex set of socio-cognitive 
capabilities and perspectives on the social world and fellow actors (Ibid.). The situation of 
strategic actors is, after all, distinct from Selman’s Level 2. This is not a case of equal actors 
who face a straightforward choice whether to deceive, as in simple competitive behaviour, or 
to be open, as in friendship. Rather, they are conscious of mutual capabilities and this 
determines their interpretation of any information they receive, and the way in which they 
transmit or withhold information with one another. For Habermas, this form of transparency 
can be most fully developed in communicative action oriented to mutual understanding.  
Significantly, Habermas has also drawn links between the development of 
perspectives in question and the historical emergence of particular forms of social cohesion 
(Habermas, 1985: 89). This approach has been taken-up in IR by thinkers such as Andrew 
Linklater, who has used it to describe processes of international moral learning leading 
towards a ‘global communication community’ (Linklater, 1998). As critics have noted, the 
teleology which accompanies this approach is problematic (Ibid.: 68-70). However, we need 
not accept Habermas’s claims about the hierarchy of forms of cognition to recognise the 
underlying point – that the cognitive position which is adopted in relation to other actors in 
strategic behaviour of the kind which concerns RCT, including those involved in 
transparency, must be understood in partly social terms. Moreover, it must implicitly be 
understood as such even by those who, like Habermas and rational choice theorists, take a 
relatively formalistic approach to social interaction.    
Even if we accept the analogy between states and persons, Habermas points to a more 
sophisticated conceptualization of transparency than ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ or 
‘transparency-as-information’ arguments in International Relations. Within the bounds of a 
formalistic understanding of knowledge specific, mutually recognised, modes of thinking 
have to be in place for transparency to make sense – transparency has to be understood in 
social terms.  Actors pursuing ‘transparency-as-information’ are involved in a form of social 
interaction in which they must recognise each other as having a relatively ‘thick’ set of 
capabilities. Scholars investigating transparency must therefore consider the ways in which 
such a social context has emerged and is maintained. Transparency is less a transcendent 
technocratic solution than a contingent historical product. 
Of the conceptions of transparency identified here, ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ best 
succeeds in highlighting the way in which transparency depends upon specific ways of 
thinking and interacting, on the particular quality of relationships as much as the quantity of 
information. Rationalism must assume something like these capabilities and relationships but 
does not itself have the resources to explain ‘how and on what basis social actors define the 
context in which their interactions transpire’ (Johnson, 1991: 194; Schiemann, 2000). 
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Rationalism in IR finds its limits at this the point, where which formalisable rational 
characteristics merge into socially acquired norms and capabilities.  
 
 
Towards a critical approach 
 
Transparency-as-dialogue provides the best theoretical starting point for further investigating 
transparency in international politics. A full exploration of how such research would proceed 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can highlight three substantive advantages of 
such an approach, already partially elaborated above. Two arise from the way transparency-
as-dialogue expands our understanding of transparency in analytical and ethical terms. The 
final  advantage arises, paradoxically, from considering the limits of Habermas’ discourse 
ethics and the danger its universality presents to the political itself.  
 First, ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ provides a basis upon which to consider the 
implications of institutional and practitioner claims about transparency, which often assume a 
model that corresponds to ‘transparency-as-disclosure’ or ‘transparency-as-information’. As 
suggested above, one of the practical limitations of conceptualizing transparency in these 
terms is that it precludes reflection on the social conditions in which interactions between 
institutions and publics have developed and continue to take place. ‘Transparency-as-
information’ is not concerned with institutional change but with how actors can produce the 
right kind of information for a given activity, failing to consider how specific institutional 
configurations limit and shape transparency as a political practice. ‘Transparency-as-
disclosure’ points to the need for institutions to change in order to provide more information, 
but does not encompass the social conditions in which the relationship between publics and 
institutions has developed. With the application of these ‘problem-solving’ conceptions the 
potential for transparency promotion to incorporate reflection on the quality of institutions, 
systems of interaction, and the nature of roles will remain relatively undeveloped. 
  For example, the promotion of financial transparency by the International Monetary 
Fund explicitly aims at ensuring that actors can make good financial or economic decisions, a 
point heavily emphasized in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (IMF, 2012). 
Its aim is to smooth the functioning of the global financial system, which is at least partly 
constituted by the model of individuals as information producers and consumers, and which 
practices of ‘transparency-as-information’ both assume and promote. Yet the assessment that 
an absence of information led to the GFC, or worsened its aftermath, is problematic. It 
neglects the ongoing structural crisis of Western economies, the politics of regulatory 
capture, and the ideological elements of the crisis (Brenner, 2006; Baker, 2010; Gamble, 
2009). ‘Transparency-as-information’ offers little basis for reflection on these aspects of the 
global financial system (Best, 2005: 150, passim). In contrast, ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ 
serves a repoliticising function, opening the door to reflection on how the global economy is 
constituted. It would require that actors articulate and justify their structural positions of 
power and the current form of capitalist world order, engaging in practices of mutual 
recognition that point towards both enhanced democratic input and increased understanding 
of complex global economic processes.  
 Asserting that some shared inter-subjective structure of understanding is necessary for 
transparency to occur is, of course, not the same as ensuring that it does occur. Differences in 
the capacities of actors to engage in transparent political practices must be recognized at the 
international level, just as they have been at the domestic level (see Fung et al 2005). For 
example, structures of international law assume shared understanding of the law and 
recognize other states as equally worthy participants in the judicial proceedings. Yet, despite 
formal recognition, in practical terms vast inequalities exist in the capacities that actors bring 
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to negotiations and international treaty-making fora (Fisher and Green, 2004; Guzman and 
Simmons, 2005).  For the ethical orientation of ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ to be realized, 
formal recognition must be coupled with measures to address substantive inequalities. To the 
extent that current practices of transparency in global politics do not undertake these practices 
– and, as noted above tend to gloss over political antagonisms – they will remain inadequate 
at best; again, the simple sharing of information cannot overcome these problems. Crafting 
transparent dialogue requires more than mutual openness – it requires substantive practices to 
remedy global inequalities (Geras, 1999). States could be willing to engage in clear and 
truthful dialogue, open to others and seeking to ensure the legitimacy of structures of 
governance, but still not appreciate the material limits of this process and the radical 
challenge that transparency presents to existing forms of global politics.  
 A second, related advantage of taking ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ as a conceptual 
starting point is that it more effectively captures the aspirations reflected in more radical calls 
for transparency along with the specific experiences driving them. This is important if IR 
scholars are to move beyond theories and policy prescriptions which simply repackage pre-
existing institutional and elite assumptions and practices and towards accounts which can 
capture the reasons for the widespread popular appeal of transparency. Pursuit of 
transparency by such actors aims as much at enhancing mutual recognition as at redressing 
the information balance between the public and institutions of governance. The moral content 
of these claims is evident in the outrage generated by the Panama Papers, a revelation of 
perfectly legal and non-corrupt practices that are nevertheless morally dubious denials of 
ethical recognition. The appeal of radical and populist calls for transparency arises from the 
specific modern circumstances in which individuals experience a tension between promised 
recognition of their autonomy and moral worth and a reality in which these things are 
actually supressed. ‘Transparency-as-dialogue’ places such aspirations at the heart of the 
concept while directing our attention to the conditions under which this can be a meaningful 
goal.  
Operating within a Critical Theory framework, ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ functions 
as both as a substantive claim about the sociological nature of transparency and as an 
immanent ideology critique of current conceptualizations. That is, ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ 
does not describe current practices of transparency in global politics in their entirety. 
Whatever the conceptual shortcomings of ‘transparency-as-information’ and ‘-disclosure’, 
these understandings do largely define the pursuit of transparency in practice. Understanding 
transparency in these terms is not illusory. Indeed, these practices operate, as all ideologies 
must, to practically sustain specific social and geopolitical relations and hierarchies. The 
social underpinnings to which ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ directs our attention – the specific 
forms of intersubjectivity and cognition – really are obscured in a manner which mirrors the 
conceptual shortcomings of ‘transparency-as-information’. Habermas’ theory is an immanent 
critique, both normative and descriptive, precisely because it identifies existing preconditions 
for the full expression of transparent politics and notes that the elements of such a practice are 
implicit in current practices yet are nevertheless not fully realized.  
 None of this shows that Habermas’ approach to transparency is a fully articulated 
theoretical or normative project demanding only practical application. Its value as a starting 
point for understanding transparency also lies in the tensions it reflects. Indeed, ambiguities 
inherent in ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ and its relationship to politics and the political, point 
to a more ambiguous dialectic of Enlightenment than often portrayed by Habermas (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 2002; Fluck, 2014; cf. Levine 2012: 96-97). Tensions are apparent if we 
consider the relationship between the theoretical basis of our critique of ‘transparency-as-
information’, on the one hand, and how ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ might look in practice, on 
the other. Our immanent critique of rationalist treatments of transparency was based on the 
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insight that socially ‘thick’ cognitive structures must be in place for signalling to make sense. 
This claim undermines the formalism of rationalist approaches – they must assume specific 
social processes and relations which are constitutive of actors and ways of ‘knowing’. Taking 
a sociological approach to transparency seems necessary, with Habermas’ Critical Theory 
providing an appropriate prompt to such thinking. ‘Transparency-as-dialogue’, with its 
orientation towards recognition, is theoretically and normatively appealing precisely because 
while – as explained above – it does not simply dismiss rationalism, it pulls in the opposite 
direction by pointing to the specific relationships that rationalism requires but suppresses. Yet 
Habermas’ ‘transparency-as-dialogue’ still requires that actors define each other in relatively 
formal and universalistic terms, and it has the potential to exclude expressions of 
intersubjective recognition that do not fit. There are strict limitations on the experiences and 
characteristics which can be drawn upon in such practice (Linklater, 1998: 93). Simply 
replacing one formalism with another does not do justice to the potentially diverse forms 
recognition may take.  
  Finally, this concept may give a full account of the conditions of transparency’s 
emergence but nevertheless fail as a viable political strategy. ‘Transparency-as-dialogue’ sits 
at the intersection of the depoliticizing tendencies of rationalism and the agonistic account of 
politics offered by Realism and certain critical approaches in IR. It suggests an optimistic 
account of how we may broaden the legacy of the Enlightenment by expanding the sphere of 
transparency. Yet struggles for recognition have historically required highly strategic and 
‘political’ action to achieve their aims. To the extent that it is universal and formalistic, 
transparency collapses the distance between different subjects, the very distance that it 
requires for its operation. Non-identity and particularity is constitutive of political agonism. 
Bridging the gap between particularities is the aim of transparency, yet the realization of this 
aim cannot be an absolute achievement without threatening its historical foundations. How 
this tension is negotiated – how contingent and partial forms of transparency may be realized 
– should be a central focus of a less hubristic, more humble approach to transparency in 






 Examining the different concepts of transparency in IR it is clear that the field uses 
the term in different ways for different purposes at different times. To date, each distinct 
theoretical approach has generated a specific understanding of ‘transparency’. Yet, as this 
discussion has highlighted, the concept of transparency seems to contain some underlying 
and unifying features which IR theorists use either implicitly or explicitly. Transparency-as-
disclosure, transparency-as-dialogue, and transparency-as-information all outline concepts 
that attempt to grasp how political actors can communicate their actions and intentions in the 
interests of stability and minimal forms of cooperation. Each concept outlines, implicitly or 
explicitly, the centrality of understanding the information communicated. Each concept 
discloses some understanding of publicity and publicness as a central dimension of political 
interactions and outcomes.  
 These similarities do not override the differences between the concepts. 
Transparency-as-dialogue operates at a higher level of generality than either of the other 
approaches, refraining from defining the specific actors that constitute a transparent 
relationship. It stresses the central role of mutual recognition of actors as fundamental to 
transparency, while actors are assumed to recognize one another in the other 
conceptualizations. And in its strong emphasis upon shared understanding – shared epistemic 
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frameworks and capacities – it again contains what the other concepts assume. Transparency-
as-dialogue thereby functions as a deeper concept in its content, captures the familiar and 
resonant meanings of ‘transparency’, articulates a broad field of application while still 
historically delimited, and differentiates transparency from simple quantitative information 
flows for theoretically clear reasons. ‘Transparency-as-information’ and ‘transparency-as-
disclosure’ should continue to be used within International Relations – both capture important 
manifestations of the current political practice of transparency – but as concepts with 
adjectives, with the meaning of transparency reserved for the larger term. 
 Adopting this analytical practice has the benefit of retaining the boundedness that 
information transparency and disclosure transparency denote, while still pointing towards the 
broader historical and social underpinnings of transparent social relations. Such an approach 
also performs an integrative function in a discipline often characterized as fractured. At the 
very least, it would give our empirical treatments of transparency greater sophistication and 
facilitate dialogue between different theoretical frameworks towards some of the most 
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1
 Rationalist theories of conflict are now primarily associated with the pioneering work of Fearon (1994, 1995, 
1997). However, Bull (1977) and (Keohane 1989) each use the term to refer to quite different approaches. We 




                                                                                                                                                                     
2
 However, our focus is not upon different logics of social action. We are interested in how shared 
epistemological frameworks are generated and function. 
3
 Tracing etymology is an important first step in concept development. See Gerring (1999: 360-362, 368) and, in 
practice, Williams (1976) 
4
 Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pushing us to clarify this point.  
5
 See e.g.McCarthy (2015: 111-117). 
6
 Morgenthau  (1946) is a classic critique of such assumptions. 
7
 The rational choice approach has been subject to significant criticism in political science and social theory 
more generally. See Green and Shapiro (1994), Taylor (2006), Hindmoor (2011).  
8
 Rational choice approaches often assert their rigor and clarity in contrast to non-RCT scholarship – see e.g. 
Morrow (1994) and  Niou and Ordeshook (1999).  
9
 The IR literature often portrays rationalism as based upon self-interested actors, but this is not a foundational 
assumption of RCT scholarship (cf. Lynch 2002: 195; Quackenbush 2002; Manzo 2013: 364, 369).  
10
 Blainey (1973) is often cited in support, but includes factors such as national morale, ideology, and even 
seasons as creating inaccurate information, suggesting his assumption of rationality is not reducible to the RCT 
approach (1973: 54-56; see also Fearon 1995: 392).  
11
 Mercer is correct in identifying RCT models as attempts ‘to explain how one should reason, not how one 
actually reasons’ (Mercer 2005: 80). Elster (1994) and Glaser (2010: 2-3, 20) explicitly note that RCT models 
how actors should act, not how they do act. 
12
 These references are only a small sample of a large literature.  
13
 For a sample of the debate concerning the existence of audience costs see Snyder and Borghard (2011); 
Trachtenberg (2012); Mercer (2012).  
14
 RCT approaches thereby seem to hold prestige or honour as a central value of domestic audiences, although 
this is seldom clarified.  
15
 The notion of ‘targeted transparency’, according to which the concept is meaningless unless it involves the 
transmission of relevant information in an understandable form, has been developed by Fung et al. (2005). 
16
 Understanding knowledge as ‘true belief’ is, of course, a highly contested position – Gettier (1963) provides 
the classic refutation of this claim.  
17
 In order stay on the same terrain as rationalist IR we do not consider the rationality of groups or the problem 
of treating the state as a unitary actor.  
